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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-PRIMARY JURISDICTION-AVAILABILITY OF COM· 
MON-LAW REPARATIONS REMEDY FOLLOWING COMMISSION FINDING OF UN-
REASONABLE PRACTICE UNDER THE MoTOR CARRIER Acr-The petitioner 
delivered goods to respondent, a common carrier by motor vehicle, for 
shipment from Buffalo, New York, to New York City, with the route of 
shipment left unspecified. The goods were shipped over the carrier's 
interstate route at a higher tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission rather than over its intrastate route at the lower tariff filed 
with the New York Public Service Commission. Alleging causes of action 
under the Motor Carrier Act1 and at common law, the petitioner brought 
a postshipment action in a federal district court seeking reparation of the 
difference paid. The court, after a finding by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission that the carrier's routing practice was unreasonable,2 dis-
missed the action on the ground that the act neither provided a repara-
tions remedy nor preserved any cause of action existing at common law.3 
The court of appeals affirmed, on the same grounds, one judge dissenting.4 
On certiorari, held, reversed, three Justices dissenting. The complaint, 
coupled with the Commission's finding that the carrier's selection of the 
more costly route was an unreasonable practice, states a justiciable com-
mon-law claim preserved by the "savings clause"5 of the act. Hewitt-
Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962). 
Congress has entrusted supervision of the nation's network of rail, 
marine, and motor vehicle transportation to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. With respect to the relationship between carrier and ship-
per, the act simply provides that "unreasonable practices" are unlawful,6 
and leaves the formulation of standards of reasonableness to the Commission's 
discretion. A shipper or carrier can challenge the legality of a given 
practice along either of two avenues. He may bring a proceeding before 
the Commission alleging the perpetration of practices "unreasonable" 
1 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1958). The complaint specifi-
cally alleged that the carrier's misrouting constituted a violation of 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 
as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316 (1958), which imposes upon every common carrier by 
motor vehicle the duty to observe just and reasonable practices. A motor carrier, in 
the absence of routing instructions, is under a duty to select the least expensive route, un-
less it is an unreasonable one; this duty is not affected by the failure of the Motor Carrier 
Act to grant shippers the right to designate routes. See Murray Co. v. Morrow, Inc., 
54 M.C.C. 442, 444 (1952). Such a right is given shippers by rail. See 36 Stat. 551 (1910), 
49 u.s.c. § 15(8) (1958). 
2 Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 302 I.C.C. 173 (1957). 
3 187 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
4 293 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1961). 
5 49 Stat. 560 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 316(j) (1958), providing, "Nothing in this section 
shall be held to extinguish any remedy or right not inconsistent herewith." 
6 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(5) (1958) (railroads); 49 Stat. 558 
(1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1958) (motor carriers); 54 Stat. 934 (1940), 49 
U.S.C. § 905(a) (1958) (marine carriers). 
[ 1159] 
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within the contemplation of the act. If the Commission finds the practices 
unreasonable, typically it grants prospective relief by issuance of cease-
and-desist orders enforceable, if necessary, by court injunction. Alterna-
tively, as in the principal case, the injured party may bring an original 
judicial proceeding asserting a common-law or statutory cause of action. 
In this event the court, in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, 
will refer the controlling determination as to whether a given practice is 
"unreasonable" to the Commission. 7 Once the Commission has decided 
that a particular practice is "unreasonable," the question of providing a 
remedy presents a further difficulty. As to rail and water transportation, 
the statute expressly provides that the Commission can award postshipment 
reparations. 8 But provision for such a remedy is conspicuously absent from the 
Motor Carrier Act.9 In the principal case the Court tacitly conceded that the 
act did not create a statutory cause of action for reparations upon which re-
lief might be granted.10 The common-law claim, however, was viewed 
as providing a permissible alternative. The facts alleged-that the carrier 
had available two alternative routes, that the route taken was detrimental 
to the shipper and of advantage only to the carrier, and that the route 
selected demanded a higher tariff than the route avoided-appear to 
constitute a sufficient basis for recovery at common law.11 The Court con-
7 See Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrantsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 498 (1958); Texas &: Pac. 
Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). The practice of referring the 
resolution of issues within its special competence to an administrative agency is required 
by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, first enunciated in the Abilene decision. The 
doctrine applies only to an original judicial action to enforce a common-law or statutory 
right, where an exercise of jurisdiction by the court, without reference to the agency, 
might produce non-uniformity of decision or possibly a less informed decision since the 
court lacks the agency's supposed qualifications. Primary jurisdiction is to be distinguished 
from the doctrine of exhaustion which requires a litigant to exhaust his administrative 
remedies before looking to the courts. There the claim is enforceable solely by ad-
ministrative action, and the court is asked to give relief prior to the entry of a final 
order by the agency. See generally Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered, 102 U. PA. 
L. R.Ev. 577 (1954). 
s 24 Stat. 382 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9 (1958) (railroads); 54 Stat. 940 
(1940), 49 U.S.C. §§ 908(b), (c) (1958) (marine carriers). 
9 The Interstate Commerce Commission has indeed conceded its own inability to 
award reparations for past violations involving motor carriers. See Hearings on S. 1194 
Before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong., 2d 
Sess. ll-12 (1948). 
10 Cf. Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 
(1951). 
11 Relief appears to be available on several theories. At common law a carrier was 
under a duty not to charge an excessive sum, and the excess paid could be recovered 
in an action for money had and received. See CHrITY, CARRIERS 189 (1857). The shipper's 
theory here was that he had been injured because the carrier acted contrary to good 
faith and honesty, analogizing to the situation where a buyer is cheated by false weights 
and measures. See 3 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES •165. The shipper also seems to have 
had a sufficient basis for restitutionary recovery. The complaint alleged that the carrier 
had received moneys which in good conscience should belong to the shipper. "This 
kind of equitable action, to recover back money, which ought not in justice to be 
kept • • • lies only for money which ex aequo et bono, the defendant ought to refund 
. • . upon a consideration which happens to fail; or for money got through • • • an 
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eluded that the act, because of its "savings clause," did not extinguish 
this common-law remedy, and that, once the Commission had found the 
practice "unreasonable," the shipper set forth a claim upon which repara-
tions might be granted.12 
The Court's decision is of interest because of its apparent neutralizing 
effect upon the doctrine enunciated in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. 
Northwestern Public Service Co.13 and T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States.14 
In Montana-Dakota the Court unanimously approved prior decisions15 in-
sofar as they held that, where Congress had conferred primary jurisdiction 
over a certain subject matter upon an administrative agency,16 the stat-
utory standard of reasonableness was for administrative rather than judi-
cial determination. The majority in that case carried the primary juris-
diction doctrine a step further by holding that, where the issue of 
reasonableness is not severable from the issue of liability, and where 
Congress has withheld from the agency remedial power, it is to be pre-
sumed that a judicial remedy is not available or has been repealed by 
implication.17 The decision in T.I.M.E. refined the Montana-Dakota 
concept in terms of the type of problem presented by the principal case.18 
Again a majority of five seemed convinced that, had Congress intended 
reparative relief to be available, it would have so provided in the statute 
and not have relied upon judicial improvisation.19 The Court, moreover, 
undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's situation, contrary to laws made for the 
protection of persons under those circumstances." Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 
1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 680-81 (K.B. 1760). (Emphasis added.) 
12 Principal case at 87. 
13 341 U.S. 246 (1951). 
14 359 U.S. 464 (1959). 
15 E.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). 
16 In Montana-Dakota the statute in question was the Federal Power Act which, 
like the Motor Carrier Act, provides no reparations remedy to recover for rates paid 
in the past which are subsequently determined to be unreasonable. 
17 If the majority in Montana-Dakota meant that a court could never properly refer 
controlling issues to a regulatory agency for an administrative determination and then 
grant relief on the basis of the agency's finding, the holding would seem so contrary 
to the original primary jurisdiction doctrine which the ,majority cited with approval 
as to be difficult to justify. Cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 
426 (1907). If, on the other hand, the Court meant that, where there is seemingly no 
reason in the case presented why Congress should have intended a judicial improvisa-
tion, a court must exercise restraint, then the decision seems more tenable, albeit 
somewhat broad. For in the last analysis a court's approach should not tum upon an 
abstract distaste for judicial improvisation but an accommodation of the competing 
policies implicit in dispensing the judicial remedy. This was the approach of the Court 
in the principal case. 
1s T .I.M ..E. extended the Montana-Dakota doctrine to a setting almost identical to 
that of the principal case. The case concerned the Motor Carrier Act, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the question of a postshipment reparations remedy after 
a Commission finding that rates charged were unreasonable. 
19 The Court in T .I.M.E. was helped by an additional consideration. Congress had 
provided a statutory procedure whereby rates could be challenged initially by the 
shipper. See 49 Stat. 561 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 317(c) (1958), providing that proposed 
rate increases must be filed with the Commission thirty days in advance of effect, and 
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showed concern that the award of reparations would bring about a judi-
cially created extension of the Commission's power. It concluded that 
when the administrator vested with primary jurisdiction has no authority 
to award reparations, he may not employ the courts as accomplices to 
effectuate by indirection what he might not do directly.20 
The Court in the principal case, conceding that primary jurisdiction 
as to misrouting practices was in the Commission,21 expressly distinguished 
T.I.M.E. and by implication its parent, Montana-Dakota, on the ground 
that they involved unreasonable rates, while the principal case presented 
the issue of unreasonable routing practices.22 The Court then concluded 
that application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine did not result in 
the absence of a judicial remedy in every instance in which the Commis-
sion could not award reparations. Consequently, the Court has now 
acknowledged the existence of exceptions to the doctrine stated in Montana-
Dakota and T.I.M.E. where an appraisal of the competing policy con-
siderations convinces a court that relief is consistent with the legislative 
purpose.23 The holding seems something of a turnabout. Montana-Dakota, 
insofar as it held that a court cannot grant relief if a substantial issue in 
the case is primarily within the jurisdiction of an administrative agency 
powerless to grant such relief, has clearly been overruled. It seems certain, 
as well, that the Court will not hesitate in the future to improvise an 
appropriate remedy in the interest of justice or a desirable result in a 
particular case, simply because there appears to be no reason to suppose 
that Congress did not contemplate such an improvisation. But even more 
strikingly, the continued vitality of the T.l.M.E. decision, decided only 
four terms ago, may be in doubt. The present departure from T.I.M.E. 
is explicable either because the route-rate distinction is sufficiently sub-
stantial so as to be controlling or because of a reversal in attitude at-
tributable to intervening changes in the Court's personnel.24 If the former 
49 Stat. 559 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316(g) (1958), providing that proposed rate 
increases may be suspended for seven months pending determination of their reason• 
ableness. 
20 T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 475 (1959). 
21 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Solum, 247 U.S. 477 (1918). 
22 Principal case at 87. 
23 The policies that the Court in the principal case found controlling appear per-
suasive. The Court noted that there exists no procedure for initially challenging route 
violations before the Commission as there is for rates charged. Rates typically are 
known to the shipper prior to carriage. Routes, however, are customarily determined 
by the shipper on an ad hoc basis. The Court also reasoned that the damage remedy 
will have a deterrent effect of minimizing litigation before the Commission and the 
courts. To deny relief, moreover, would leave the shipper at the carrier's mercy. In the 
two prior rate cases, Montana-Dakota and T .IM.E., the Court noted that the denial 
of reparations there would not work such an injustice. 
24 Justices Brennan, Frankfurter, Harlan, Stewart, and Whittaker comprised the 
majority in T .IM.E., with Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Clark and Douglas 
dissenting. In the principal case Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Brennan, Clark, 
Douglas and Goldberg comprised the majority, while Justices Harlan, Stewart and 
White dissented. 
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is the correct explanation, clearly then the rule in T.I.M.E. will obtain in 
a case involving unreasonable rates or an analogous situation. If the latter 
sheds any light, then one can only infer that T.I.M.E. also has been sent 
to its demise,25 and that a new approach to the question has been enun-
ciated, not without problems of its own.26 
The Court's route-rate distinction appears justified in that it reflects 
a functional distinction in the nature of the Commission's regulatory 
duties. The objective of the Interstate Commerce Act is the development 
and implementation of a national transportation policy27 which the Com-
mission was established to effectuate.28 The Court, in evolving the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine, has recognized that, in the administration of national 
transportation policy, the normative standard of practice should be deter-
mined by the agency and not the courts.29 The Court has reasoned that 
the Commission is supposedly more competent than the courts in making 
certain determinations,30 and that, in other determinations where this is 
not necessarily the case, an administrative rather than a judicial deter-
mination would insure a uniform national rule.31 In motor carrier cases, 
a court would appear to enjoy equal competence with the administrator 
in matters concerning undue preferences or unfair practices.82 The court 
would also seem burdened but not unduly troubled by questions of safety 
regulation. Safety regulation arose from a technological law never made 
by judges, but clearly it is not of a complexity which would preclude 
25 Presumably Chief Justice ·warren and Justices Black, Clark and Douglas adhere to 
their former view, while Justice Brennan changed his position on the basis of the 
route-rate distinction. The continued vitality of the T J.M.E. decision will depend upon 
the positions taken in the future by Justices White and Goldberg; a present appraisal 
of their viewpoint would be but conjecture. 
26 The Court here holds that the Interstate Commerce Act by virtue of its "savings 
clause" preserves a common-law cause of action. Principal case at 87. On remand the 
district court will, under familiar principles, grant relief on the basis of the common 
law of the state where it sits. Conceivably, future actions of this kind will be brought 
in state courts after Commission determination, particularly if the federal jurisdictional 
amount of $10,000 is lacking. If this occurs, not only two trials in the same case-
obviously an unwieldy and expensive procedure-will be generated, but also a new state 
participation in the regulation of interstate commerce, and possible local administration 
of an important national problem, might result. 
27 54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1958), providing, "It is hereby declared 
to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to . • • foster sound economic 
conditions in transportation and among the several carriers ••• all to the end of develop-
ing, coordinating and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway 
and rail ••• adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States .•. :• 
(Emphasis added.) 
28 See Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)-
20 See Texas &: Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907). 
30 See, e.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952). 
31 See Texas &: Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 441 (1907). 
32 See 49 Stat. 558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1958), which declares it 
unlawful for a motor carrier while engaged in interstate commerce "to subject any 
particular person . • . to any unjust discrimination, or any undue or unreasonable 
prejudice or disadvantage.'' The Court has given this provision the broadest possible 
social thrust by extending its scope to racial discrimination· in interstate commerce. 
Cf. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960). 
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judicial determination. The decisional process in cases of this kind, which 
calls for a finding of fact, the application of existing authority, and, at 
times, a construction of the controlling statute or regulation, is as familiar 
to the court as to the administrator. The courts have deferred to the 
Commission in these matters not because they are less competent, but 
because they have realized that the administration of the statute presents 
a uniquely nationwide problem requiring uniform national rules. The 
judicial process, however, may not be possessed of an equal competence 
in other areas of regulation. While the resolution of such questions as mis-
routing, safety procedures, or undue preferences imports indirect economic 
incidents such as the effect upon the relative competitive positions of car-
riers who comply or evade, or the increased cost of equipment and opera-
tion attributable to safety devices and procedures, their economic ramifica-
tions seem clearly ancillary. Direct economic regulation, however, is 
exclusively a function of agency power. The Commission, for example, 
controls conditions of admission into the industry;33 the type of service 
to be rendered;84 the expansion or contraction of the carrier's routes;35 
compulsory insurance regulations; 36 the levels of rates and fares; 87 merger, 
consolidation and acquisition;38 and the issuance of securities by companies 
within the industry.39 In proceedings involving such matters, the courts 
have deferred to Commission decision, not only for the purpose of achiev-
ing uniform national regulation, but also for the paramount reason that 
they acknowledge the agency's expertise and appreciate the perils of 
judicial intrusion into these most technical and sensitive areas.40 The 
administrator, in theory possessed of expert economic knowledge, aware 
to the moment of subtle problems of the industry, and free to ignore 
precedent in response to changing economic conditions, is unquestionably 
better equipped to be architect of national policy. 
~ careful examination of the reasons for reference by the judiciary 
to administrative tribunals provides a meaningful basis for decision in 
situations such as Montana-Dakota, T.I.M.E., the principal case and 
similar future cases. Montana-Dakota and T.I.M.E. concerned a most vital ele-
ment of direct economic regulation-the rate structure. The existence of a 
reparations remedy enforceable in the courts could well undermine the 
integrity of that structure by giving formulations of economic policy by 
ss 49 Stat. 551 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 306 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 306(a)(4) (Supp. III, 1961). 
34 49 Stat. 552 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 308 (1958). 
85 Ibid. 
86 49 Stat. 557 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 315 (1958). 
87 49 Stat. 558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316 (1958). 
38 49 Stat. 555 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1958); 54 Stat. 905 (1940), as 
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1958). It is interesting that any consolidation authorized 
by the Commission relieves the carrier from the operation of the antitrust laws. See 
54 Stat. 908 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1958). 
89 49 Stat. 557 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 314 (1958). 
40 Cf. Jaffe, supra note 7. 
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the Commission a congressionally unintended retroactive effect. The 
remedy, moreover, would augment the Commission's economic power by 
providing an additional coercive weapon in policy enforcement not sanc-
tioned by Congress. The principal case, in sharp contrast, concerned a 
regulatory function of a different nature, one which the courts would seem 
equipped to perform equally as well as the Commission. The problem 
was not that of certificating a given route where the agency must make an 
economic judgment affecting the expansion of the carrier's activities; the 
complaint sounded in tort and nothing more. The approach, then, in 
cases of this type, should not be so broad as to require judicial inertia 
simply because Congress has delegated supervision of a segment of the 
economy to an administrative custodian. It is appropriate for a court to 
inquire into why it has referred the determination of questions arising 
under the act to the Commission. If the reason is that the Commission 
supposedly enjoys superior competence to deal with the problem because 
it involves rate making or some other economic determination, the courts 
should be as reluctant to tamper with the Commission's function by grant-
ing an improvised remedy as they have been as to passing on rights asserted 
under the act. If, however, it appears that court and agency have equal 
competence to determine the right, but the question has been referred 
to insure a uniform national rule, the courts should grant appropriate 
relief only after an administrative determination of the issues within its 
primary jurisdiction. Here the courts act in an area of traditional judicial 
competence, and where any economic effect is ancillary and minimal. The 
principal case seems entirely consistent with this analysis, as do the 
Montana-Dakota and T.I.M.E. decisions. If the Court adheres to its dis-
tinction between the principal case and T.I.M.E., an appropriate refine-
ment and clarification of the T.I.M.E. doctrine will continue to exist. If, 
however, in decisions to come, the view prevails that T.I.M.E. was over-
ruled by the principal case, then the Court would appear to have under-
taken an unfortunate invasion of congressional and administrative preroga-
tive and to have perilously entered the dark area of economic planning, 
upon which even experts, in their disagreement, seem to shed a modicum 
of light. 
James D. Zirin 
